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Bright-Line Rules: Development of the Law of
Search and Seizure During Traffic Stops
Honorable Daniel T. Gillespie*

I.

INTRODUCTION

1
"Aman's home is his castle, and I'm king of this castle, Alice."

The concept that a man's home is his castle is steeped in tradition.
Even the King of England could not enter a home without a warrant. As
William Pitt declared in the British Parliament:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force of
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow
through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of
all his force dares not cross the threshold of
England may not enter;
2
the ruined tenement.
The United States followed the same tradition of jurisprudence requiring a warrant, which shall not issue "but upon probable cause,"3 before a government agent can enter a home for a search.4 A different
view, however, governs searches of persons in transit. Chief Justice
William Howard Taft, writing the majority opinion in Carroll v. United
States,5 noted that the First Congress distinguished between the necessity for a search warrant for goods subject to forfeiture in the home and
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Cook County, for their research and editorial assistance as well as their critical insight.
1. Ralph Kramden, The Honeymooners.
2. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49-50 n.l (1937), quoted in 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 1.1(a), at 4 (3d ed. 1996).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (developing the exclusionary rule,
which prohibited the use of evidence at trial seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
*
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for goods subject to forfeiture being transported in a movable vessel.6
Chief Justice Taft reasoned that transported goods could be distinguished from goods within the home because goods being transported
could be put beyond the reach of a search warrant before the warrant
was issued.7 The Carroll opinion recalled that the First, Second, and
Fourth Congresses passed legislation authorizing customs officers to
enter a vessel, conduct a search, seize goods subject to a duty tax that
was not paid, or seize any goods that they believed were brought ille8
gally into the country, all without a warrant.
During what has come to be known as America's Century, the automobile emerged as the dominant mode of transportation. Although a
man's home remains his castle, 9 a person's automobile receives much
less protection from the vicissitudes of a police search than a person's
home. In the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court's decisions regarding automobile searches and seizures supported expectations of privacy over effective law enforcement. 10 More recently, the Court's decisions have favored state interests by specifically assisting the police in
the performance of official duties and providing bright-line rules that
1
expanded police authority to search a detainee during a traffic stop. '
This ebb and flow in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seems to reflect the times. The Court initially fashioned the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement during Prohibition, when bootleggers, who
were successfully transporting liquor in clandestine fashion by truck and
auto, confounded federal authorities. 12 During the 1960s and 1970s,
when courts paid more attention to defendants' rights and individual
expectations of privacy, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence shifted to re-

6. See id. at 147.
7. See id. (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). Chief Justice Taft noted that a
movable vessel poses special considerations for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 151.
8. See id. at 149-50 (noting Congress's intent to allow such warrantless searches under its
early legislation, which mainly dealt with revenue laws).
9. See Payton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (holding that police may not enter a
suspect's home without an arrest warrant absent exigent circumstances).
10. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979), overruled by California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6 (1977), overruled by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); see also infra Part III (discussing the opinions in Sanders and
Chadwick).
11. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579 (holding that police may search an automobile where they
have probable cause to believe it contains contraband); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800
(1982) (holding that the police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle thought to contain
contraband as thoroughly as a warrant would provide).
12. See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the automobile exception in Carroll).
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flect this more liberal bent. 13 Today, in the midst of the war on drugs,
the Supreme Court's search and seizure decisions favoring state interests through the setting of bright-line rules for effective law enforcement are not surprising.
The development of bright-line rules in search and seizure cases
helps law enforcement officials as well as trial and appellate courts.
Police officials can more easily instruct officers in broad, clear-cut
terms as to the legal procedures for conducting searches and seizures.
Trial judges can more easily apply bright-line rules in deciding cases.
Appellate courts can expect fewer appeals seeking clarification of
search and seizure law. Yet, these benefits do not come without a cost.
Unfortunately, the rights of individuals receive less attention when the
thrust of the analysis shifts from whether an individual had a reasonable
expectation of privacy-in the purse of a woman who is not a suspect of
any wrong doing, for example-to whether an officer had probable
cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband.
This Article traces the evolving tension between state interests and
the right to individual privacy in search and seizure jurisprudence. It
begins by highlighting early cases that figure prominently in current decisions. 14 It then discusses 1970s cases that tilted the balance in favor
of individual rights. 15 Finally, the Article examines two recent Supreme
Court rulings: Wyoming v. Houghton,16 which follows the trend toward
state interests, and Knowles v. Iowa, 17 which appears to fly in the face
of that trend. 18 These cases offer opposing rationales for the current
state of the law regarding searches pursuant to a traffic stop of the motorist.
II.

EARLY CASES

In 1925, the Supreme Court outlined the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection in the realm of traffic stops with its decision in Carroll v.
United States. 19 In Carroll, federal prohibition agents trailed the infamous Carroll boys. 20 Acting without a warrant, federal prohibition
13. See infra notes 70-90 & 120-43 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning in
Chadwick and Sanders, respectively).
14. See infra Part II (discussing Carroll and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)).
15. See infra Part III (discussing Chadwick and Sanders).
16. Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
17. Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct. 484 (1998).
18. See infra Part IV (discussing Houghton and Knowles).
19. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20. See id. at 135. George Carroll and John Kiro were known bootleggers, wanted by federal
prohibition agents, who patrolled the roads between Detroit and Grand Rapids. See id. at 135-36.
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agents stopped and searched the defendants' car sixteen miles east of
Grand Rapids, Michigan. 2 1 They recovered sixty-eight bottles of bootleg whiskey and gin from behind the seat upholstery. 22 The Court held
that a search warrant was unnecessary where government agents
had
23
probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway.
In reaching this holding, the Carroll Court first considered the scope
of the National Prohibition Act (the "Act"), which provided that federal
24
agents needed a search warrant to search a home for illegal liquor.
Specifically, the Carroll Court questioned whether the Act was applicable in the context of an automobile search for bootleg liquor, thereby
requiring a search warrant prior to executing such a search.25 The Court
presumed that Congress did not want federal agents conducting warrantless invasions of private homes across America in search of bootleg
liquor. Indeed, the Court pointed out that the Act even provided for the
punishment of any federal agent who searched a private home without a
warrant. 26 Nevertheless, the Act contained no provision prohibiting
agents from conducting warrantless searches of vehicles believed to
27
contain liquor in violation of the Eighteenth Amendment.
In Carroll,Chief Justice Taft observed that the First Congress, during
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, required a warrant to search a
home for contraband. 28 In contrast, however, Congress permitted warrantless searches for contraband in transit upon probable cause. 29 Chief
Justice Taft noted that goods in transit differed from goods in the home
because a party could quickly move the goods in transit out of the jurisdiction before officials could obtain a warrant. 30 Thus, Carroll estab21. See id. at 136.
22. See id. The arresting prohibition agents recognized the defendants' car, an Oldsmobile
Roadster, from a prior undercover operation. See id. at 135.
23. See id. at 153.
24. See id. at 144 (noting that section 6 of the Act provides that "if any officer or agent or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement [of this Act] shall search any private
dwelling ... without a warrant directing a search ... he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor") (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. See id. at 143 (citing National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 315, passed by Congress to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment).
26. See id. at 144 (citing National Prohibition Act, ch. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223, which made an
officer who conducted a warrantless search of a dwelling under this Act subject to-a "fine or imprisonment or both").
27. See id. at 146.
28. See id. at 150-51 (noting a "difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling ... and concealed in a movable
vessel").
29. See id.
30. See id. at 153.
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lished the first bright-line rule that officials may search an automobile
without a warrant on probable cause to believe it contains contraband.3 1
Forty-five years later, in Chambers v. Maroney,32 the Court extended
the CarrollCourt's automobile exception, holding that if police officers
had probable cause to stop a car and search it for guns and stolen
money, they also could perform a subsequent warrantless search of that
car at the police station. 33 Chambers involved the gunpoint robbery of a
Gulf service station in North Braddock, Pennsylvania on the evening of
May 20, 1963. 34 Within an hour of the robbery, the police stopped a
blue compact station wagon, in which Frank Chambers rode, because
the wagon matched the description of the getaway car. 35 The police
immediately arrested the four men in the car, took the car to the police
station, and thoroughly searched it. 36 During the search, the police recovered two revolvers, one of which was loaded, as well as cards bearing the name of Raymond Havicon, the attendant at another service sta37
tion who was robbed one week earlier in McKeesport, Pennsylvania.
38
Chambers was subsequently convicted of both robberies.
Unlike the car in Carroll, the police did not search Chambers's car
until some time after the arrest. 39 Because of the timing of the search,
the Court held that the search of the car was not justified as a search incident to an arrest. 4° The Court first noted, however, that' pursuant to
Carroll,the police certainly could have legally searched the car for guns
and stolen money at the scene. 4 1 The Court then extended Carroll's
31. See id.
32. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
33. See id. at 43 (affirming the Third Circuit's decision that no Fourth Amendment violation
occurred).
34. See id. at 44.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 46. Chambers did not seriously dispute, and the court agreed, that the police had
probable cause to stop the vehicle matching the description of the getaway car and arrest him at
the scene. See id. Instead, Chambers's case came before the Supreme Court on review of the
denial of his petition for habeas corpus. See id.
39. See id. at 47. The significance of this issue is clear. In Carroll, Chief Justice Taft expressed concern that the car, and, hence, the evidence within it, was easily transportable. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Taft's reasoning for permitting
the warrantless search in Carroll). Here, this concern was diminished as the car had already been
taken to the police station; thus, police faced no danger in losing the evidence. See supra notes
34-38 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Chambers).
40. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 47 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964),
which stated that "[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another
place ... is simply not incident to an arrest").
41. See id. at 48; see also supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning

6
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holding, reasoning that because the armed robbery suspects were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle of the night, a careful search at
that point was impractical and unsafe for the officers. 42 Accordingly,
under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the Court concluded that the police officers acted reasonably when they searched the
43
car at the station rather than at the scene.
Both Carroll and Chambers foreshadowed the opinions of and pro-

vided the foundation for two recent Supreme Court rulings: Knowles v.
Iowa and Wyoming v. Houghton.'

Both Carrolland Chambers focused

on whether the officers had probable cause to search the vehicles for
45
contraband, rather than on the vehicle owners' expectation of privacy.
In contrast, neither United States v. Chadwick46 nor Arkansas v. Sanders,4 7 both decided during the 1970s Warren Court era, relied upon either Carrollor Chambers.48 The Chadwick Court rejected the notion

that the Warrant Clause 49 protects only dwellings and other specifically
designated locales, noting that the Fourth Amendment "protects people,
not places." 50 The contrasting opinions of the Court reveal the ebb and
flow in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Some decisions establish
bright-line rules to assist law enforcement officials, while others protect
the privacy rights of individuals. The modern Court has promoted the

51
interests of'the state over the privacy interests of individual citizens.
Unfortunately, a bright-line rule that promotes effective law enforcement provides less attention to individual rights.

in Carroll).
42. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52 n.10.
43. See id.
44. See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing Knowles and Houghton).
45. See supra notes 24-31 and 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing the bases of the
Court's opinions in Carroll and Chambers, respectively).
46. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 (1991).
47. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565 (1991).
48. See infra Part I (discussing Chadwick and Sanders).
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause provides "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
50. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). Similarly, the Sanders Court emphasized the importance of the Warrant Clause in concluding that the
state of Arkansas failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of
luggage properly taken from automobiles. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763.
51. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that the Supreme Court's recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence places state interests above individual privacy interests).
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III.

THE PENDULUM SWINGS AWAY FROM THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE

52
"Something there is that doesn't love a wall."
If Robert Frost were describing the Chadwick and Sanders Courts, he
might have written instead, "[s]omething there is in Justice that doesn't
like a search without a warrant." If Frost were writing from the viewpoint of the authors of Chadwick and Sanders, he might have replaced
the language "[glood fences make good neighbors" from his poem,
Mending Wall,53 with the statement "[g]ood warrants make good police
officers." In the late 1970s, the Warren Court authored the Chadwick
and Sanders opinions, representing a marked shift from the Court's pre54
vious position in Carroll v. United States and Chambers v. Maroney.
Rather than place the state's interest in effective law enforcement above
the privacy interests of motorists, the Warren Court restricted the bright55
line rules that had established the automobile exception.

A.

United States v. Chadwick

In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents waited at the Boston train station for people matching the defendants' descriptions. 56 A dog trained
to smell narcotics "alerted" the agents to the presence of narcotics inside
the footlocker being transported by defendants Gregory Machado and
Bridget Leary. 57 As the suspects loaded the footlocker into Chadwick's
waiting car outside the train station, officers arrested all three suspects. 58 The agents took the three arrestees and the footlocker to the
Boston Federal Building. 59 At the federal building, an hour and a half
later, the agents opened the footlocker and found marijuana. 6° The
Government sought to justify its failure to secure a search warrant under
both the automobile exception of Chambers and as a search incident to

52. Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROBERT
FROST 112 (1951).
53. Id.
54. See infra Part III.A-B (discussing the opinions in Chadwick and Sanders, respectively).
55. See supra Part II (discussing the development of the "automobile exception").
56. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,3 (1977), overruled by California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991). Two days prior, Amtrak officials observed the defendants load a footlocker
on to the train. See id. They noticed talcum power on the footlocker, which is often used to mask
the smell of marijuana. See id. They alerted federal agents to this event. See id.
57. See id. at 3-4.
58. See id at 4. "A search disclosed no weapons, but the keys to the footlocker were apparently taken from Machado." Id.
59. See id.
60. See id. The Government conceded that the footlocker was under its agents' control the
entire time after the arrest. See id.
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arrest. 6 1 In granting the motion to suppress, the trial court rejected both
arguments and held that "[w]arrantless searches are per se unreasonable,
subject to a few carefully delineated and limited exceptions."6 2 The Supreme Court previously held that a search incident to an arrest must be
confined to the person arrested and the area from which the person arrested might reach for weapons or destructible evidence. 63 Accordingly, the trial court found that the "200-pound footlocker was not part
of 'the area from within which [defendants] might gain possession of a
weapon.' 64
On appeal, the Government argued that the Fourth Amendment's
Warrant Clause "protects only interests traditionally identified with the
home." 65 The Government, analogizing to colonial writs of assistance,
contended that the Framers adopted the Warrant Clause to protect individuals against unjustified government intrusion into private homes
without the authority of a warrant. 66 Furthermore, the Government
maintained that no evidence indicated that the Framers intended either
to "disturb the established practice of permitting warrantless searches
outside the home," or to modify the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment "by making warrantless searches supported by probable
cause per se unreasonable." 67 Essentially, the Government argued that
the warrant requirement should be limited to searches of a person's
home or other equally private areas. 68 In all other situations, the Government asserted, "less significant privacy values are at stake, and the
reasonableness of a government intrusion should depend solely on
whether there is probable cause to believe evidence of criminal conduct
69
is present."
The Chadwick Court did not agree that the Warrant Clause protected
only dwellings and other specifically designated locales.7 ° Citing Katz

61. See id. at 5.
62. Id. (citing the district court opinion, United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 771 (D.
Mass. 1975)).
63. See id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
64. Id. (quoting Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. at 771).
65. Id. at 6.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 6-7.
68. See id. at 7 (naming "homes, offices, and private communications" as the core areas of
Fourth Amendment protection).
69. Id.
70. See id. Chief Justice Burger noted that warrants had been required for many searches
conducted outside the home. See id. (citing G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338
(1977) (holding that warrants are required to search offices); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971) (holding that warrants are required to search automobiles on private premises);
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v. United States,7 1 the Court restated its position that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places." 72 Accordingly, the Court
framed the issue as "'[w]hether a search warrant is required before federal agents may open a locked footlocker that is properly in their possession and that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband.' 7 3 While acknowledging that the searches first and foremost in
the Framers's minds were those involving invasions of the home, the
Chadwick Court noted that the Warrant Clause does not distinguish
74
between searches within the home and those outside of the home.
Chief Justice Warren Burger observed that the Framers's intent regard75
ing the breadth of the Warrant Clause's application was inconclusive.
Therefore, the Court simply asked whether the search was reasonable
76
under all the circumstances.
First, the Court praised the merits of a warrant signed by a neutral
magistrate, as opposed to a warrantless search that may be carried out in
the "hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."' 77 Chief Justice Burger added that once an officer begins a search, the officer is more likely
to keep the search within reasonable bounds if conducted pursuant to a
warrant "'particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.' ' 78 The Court cited several cases where the
Court required warrants to conduct searches outside the home. 79 The
Court emphasized that a "fundamental purpose of the Fourth AmendMancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (holding that warrants are required to search offices);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that warrants are required for electronic interceptions of conversations in public phone booths); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) (holding that warrants are required to search an automobile in custody); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (holding that warrants are required to search hotel rooms)).
71. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that government eavesdropping
on a public phone call without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment).
72. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
73. Id. at 7 n.3.
74. See id. at 8 (noting that searches involving an invasion of the home were foremost in the
Framers' minds because the colonists had suffered through the King's general warrants, which
gave sweeping power to customs officials and agents of the King to search a home for smuggled
goods).
75. See id. at 8-9.
76. See id. at 9 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967)).
77. Id. at 9 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
78. Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)); see also supra note
68 (discussing contexts in which the Supreme Court required warrants for searches).
79. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478,
483-84 (1971) (determining that a warrant is needed to search a car on private property); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (holding that warrantless eavesdropping on a public
telephone violates the Fourth Amendment)).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 31

ment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests
80
found inside the four walls of the home."
Next, the Court contended that the facts and circumstances of this
8
case fell outside the automobile exception outlined in Carroll.
The
Court characterized the search at issue as a footlocker search rather than
a search of an automobile because the police transported the footlocker
to the Boston Federal Building before searching it. 82 The Court reasoned that suspects could not possibly have driven the footlocker away
before federal agents could get a warrant. 83 The Court further noted
that "luggage contents are not open to public view." 84 Thus, "unlike an
automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects., 85 Accordingly, the Court
decided that a person expects more privacy in personal luggage than he
86
or she does in an automobile.
The majority also rejected the reasoning used in Chimel v. California,87 which authorized a search of the area "within the immediate control" of the arrestee, 88 because the contents of the footlocker were not
within arm's reach of anyone. Once the officer arrested the three defendants, none of the defendants could reach for a weapon or destroy
evidence inside the double-locked footlocker. 89 Likewise, the Court
concluded that the search could not be justified as a search incident to
90
arrest because the search was not contemporaneous with the arrest.

80. Id. at 11 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
81. See id. at 13 (discussing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
88. See id. Chimel was arrested at home on the basis of an arrest warrant, not a search warrant. See id. at 753-54. Although Chimel denied officers' request to look around, they conducted
a search of the entire house on the basis of the lawful arrest. See id. The Court held that the officers needed a search warrant to search the house, limiting a search incident to arrest to an arrestee's person and the area from which he might reach a weapon or destructible evidence. See id. at
768.
89. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15.
90. See id. (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). The majority opinion
noted that once authorities have exclusive control of the seized property, and there is no danger
that the arrestee might gain access to or destroy the evidence, a search of the property can no
longer be considered incident to the arrest. See id. In this case, because an hour and a half passed
between the arrest and the search, characterizing the search of the footlocker as incident to the
arrest would be a stretch of the imagination. See id.
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Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined in dissent, ar92
91
gued that both United States v. Robinson and Gustafson v. Florida
supported this search as a search incident to arrest. 93 Gustafson and
Robinson, Justice Blackmun noted, stood for the proposition that the
Fourth Amendment required no warrant for the arresting officer to
94
Jussearch the outer clothing and effects of one placed under arrest.
tice Blackmun argued that, pursuant to the doctrine of search incident to
arrest, "a search of personal effects need not be contemporaneous with
the arrest, and indeed may be delayed a number of hours while the sus95
pect remains in lawful custody."
In addition to validating the search as incident to arrest, the dissent
also suggested that the line of authority permitting warrantless searches
of both an impounded car and the locked contents of that car supported
the reasonableness of this search. 96 Moreover, Justice Blackmun observed, "once a car has been properly impounded for any reason, the
police may follow a standard procedure for inventorying its contents
without any showing of probable cause." 97 Ultimately, Justice Blackmun extended this rationale by concluding that warrants were generally
"not required to seize and search any movable property in the posses98
sion of a person properly arrested in a public place."
Although Justice Blackmun conceded that the officer could have secured a warrant after impounding the footlocker, 99 he contended that the
officer's failure to do so did not necessarily make the search unreasonable. 1°° In addition, Justice Blackmun reasoned that if the officer did
91. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). After arresting a motorist for driving on
a revoked license, the police searched Robinson without a warrant and found heroin in a cigarette
package located in his coat pocket. See id. at 223. The Court held that a "custodial arrest of a
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment and a
search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." Id. at 235.
92. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). In Gustafson, the companion case to Robinson, the police arrested a motorist for driving without a valid license. See id. at 262. The Court
held that after arresting Gustafson and taking him into custody for driving without a license, the
officer was entitled to make a full search of his person pursuant to that arrest. See id. at 266.
93. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 19 (Blackmun, I., dissenting) (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974)); see also Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35; Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 263-66.
96. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Texas v. White, 423 U.S.
67 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-48 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 47-52 (1970)).
97. Id. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976)).
98. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 19-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards, 415 U.S. at 805; Cardwell v.
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try to secure a warrant, a judge would routinely grant it in the majority
of cases where the police seized property while arresting a person in a
public place.'' Therefore, Justice Blackmun doubted that requiring the
police to go through the formality of obtaining a warrant in similar
cases would have a substantial deterrent effect in protecting Fourth
Amendment rights. 10 2 In this light, Justice Blackmun suggested adopting a bright-line rule allowing warrantless searches of property seized in
conjunction with a valid arrest in a public place. 10 3 Such an approach,
Justice Blackmun determined, "would simplify the constitutional law of
criminal procedure without seriously derogating from the values protected by the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
' 10 4
and seizures."
Justice Blackmun favored a bright-line rule that clarified the labyrinth-like points of search and seizure for police officers. Indeed, Justice Blackmun quoted from Professor LaFave:
My basic premise is that Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and
effect by the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the
police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in
terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law
enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and
buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of
lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they
may be 'literally impossible
10 5
of application by the officer in the field.'
Justice Blackmun noted that appellate courts have construed the
automobile search exception to the warrant requirement to include
briefcases, suitcases, and footlockers inside automobiles. 1°6 Blackmun
concluded his dissent by lamenting that "decisions of the kind made by
the Court today make criminal law a trap for the unwary policeman and

Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595-96 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
101. See id. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 35455 (1974) (discussing the idea that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment serves a deterrent purpose).
103. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 22 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV.
127, 141 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218 (1973))).
106. See id. at 23 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d
1087, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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of detecting criminal activity and
detract from the important activities
10 7
protecting the public safety."'
Notably, Chadwick was not a traditional "automobile exception" case
because the police did not stop the car in traffic. Instead, the police
seized the footlocker as the defendants loaded it into the trunk of Chadwick's parked car before the engine was even started. 10 8 Chadwick's
significance in the development of search and seizure law with respect
to traffic stops arose only two terms later when the Court decided Arkansas v. Sanders, which involved a traditional automobile exception. 1°9 The Court decided Sanders by following principles laid down
in Chadwick."10
B.

Arkansas v. Sanders

In Arkansas v. Sanders, the Court granted certiorari to clarify the
meaning of Chadwick as applied to warrantless searches of luggage
seized from cars."1 In Sanders, an informant notified the Little Rock
Police Department that Lonnie Sanders would be arriving on an incoming American Airlines flight, carrying a green suitcase containing
marijuana."l 2 Little Rock Police had previously arrested Sanders based
on information from the same informant. 113 However, instead of Sand11 4
ers, a Mr. Rambo, traveling with Sanders, carried the green suitcase.
After Rambo placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi, which Sanders
and Rambo took from the airport, the police stopped the taxi and opened
115
both the trunk and the green suitcase, in which they found marijuana.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress, relying upon Chadwick and Coolidge v. New
Hampshire.116 While the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the police
officers had probable cause to believe the suitcase contained contraband, it noted that no exigent circumstances justified the officers' failure to secure a warrant for the search of the luggage. 117 Accordingly,
107. Id. at 24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 4.
109. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 (1991).
110. See id. at 762-63.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 755.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (holding that a warrantless search and
seizure of a car is unconstitutional absent the ruling of a "neutral and detached magistrate").
117. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 756.
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the court concluded that because police had control of both the automobile and the occupants, it was not impractical for them to obtain a search
warrant for the luggage. 118 Therefore, the Arkansas Supreme Court required not only that probable cause support a warrantless search but also
' 119
that the probable cause be "coupled with exigent circumstances."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Powell framed the issue as
"whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police are required to
obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken from an automobile
properly stopped and searched for contraband." 120 While stating that
"the general principles applicable to claims of Fourth Amendment violations are well settled," Justice Powell acknowledged that litigation
over suppression of evidence "continues to occupy much of the attention of courts at all levels of the state and federal judiciary." 12 1 Justice
Powell conceded that courts and law enforcement officials often find it
difficult to discern the proper application of these principles to individual cases. 122 Indeed, the circumstances giving rise to suppression requests can vary almost infinitely and, therefore, even a small difference
in the factual context may control a determination of Fourth Amendment rights. 123 In retrospect, the Court's discussion of the difficulties in
resolving Fourth Amendment litigation foreshadowed the subsequent
124
movement toward bright-line rules, as found in New York v. Belton
and other Supreme Court decisions that set bright-line rules regarding
25
search and seizure.1
First citing to Chadwick, Justice Powell commented "that a locked
footlocker could not lawfully be searched without a warrant, even
though it had been loaded into the trunk of an automobile parked at a
curb."' 126 On the other hand, Justice Powell acknowledged that, in ear118. See id.
119. See id. (citing Sanders v. State, 559 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ark. 1977)).
120. Id. at 754.
121. Id. at 757.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (holding that a search incident to a
valid arrest of persons who are or who recently have been in an automobile extends to the entire
passenger compartment and all containers, open or closed, found therein).
125. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997) (holding that an officer who has
made a valid traffic stop may order not only the driver but also passengers to exit the car); Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require that a
lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is "free to go" before the defendant's consent to
search will be recognized as voluntary); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984)
(holding that Miranda applied to misdemeanor traffic offenses but not to routine traffic stops unless or until the person is placed under arrest).
126. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 757 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)).
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lier cases, "the Court sustained the constitutionality of warrantless
searches of automobiles and their contents under what has become
127
known as the 'automobile exception' to the warrant requirement."'
for the Court's
Accordingly, Justice Powell realized that this case called
28
determination of the automobile exception's scope.'
Justice Powell posited that the Fourth Amendment generally requires
that searches of private property must be both reasonable and pursuant
to a properly issued search warrant. 129 Justice Powell stressed that the
warrant requirement should be regarded as more than simply an inconvenience to be weighed against the claims of police efficiency. 130 Nevertheless, Justice Powell conceded that the Court does not require a
search warrant under some circumstances, such as when a police officer's safety is at risk or when evidence may be lost or destroyed; 131 he
further noted that the law does not require police to have a warrant to
search a vehicle where they have probable cause to believe it contains
contraband or evidence of a crime. 132 Indeed, Carroll v. United States
expressly allows warrantless searches of vehicles properly stopped with
probable cause because it would not be practicable in such a case to secure a warrant. 133 Justice Powell, however, observed two distinctions
between automobiles and other private property: first, the inherent mobility of vehicles makes it impracticable to secure a warrant prior to
search, and, second, there is a diminished expectation of privacy associ-

127. Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925)); see also supra Part II (discussing the development of the automobile exception in
Chambers and Carroll).
128. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 757.
129. See id. at 758.
130. See id. To emphasize the importance that should be ascribed to the warrant requirement,
Justice Powell quoted from Coolidge v. New Hampshire:
The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades,
and it has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this
country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly
overzealous executive officers' who are part of any system of law enforcement.
Id. at 758 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,481 (1971) (citations omitted)).
131. Seeid.at759.
132. See id. at 760 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543, 561-62 (1976)
(holding that boarder checkpoint stops are consistent with the Fourth Amendment); Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (holding that police may still have probable cause to search a car at
the station house if they had probable cause to search the car at an earlier point); United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 892-98 (1975) (holding that non-border checkpoints violate the Fourth
Amendment)).
133. See id. at761.
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ated with property transported in a vehicle. 134 Justice Powell thus concluded that the police were justified in stopping the vehicle, searching it
on the spot, and seizing the suitcase suspected of containing contraband
because the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant was
135
driving away with contraband.
Having conceded that the police had the authority to seize the suitcase, Justice Powell then addressed the issue of whether the police
could then search the suitcase without a warrant. 136 Justice Powell
noted that Chadwick generally requires a warrant before police could
lawfully search the luggage. 137 As in Chadwick, Justice Powell observed that because the police had the luggage in their possession, there
was no danger that defendants might move it before the police could secure a warrant. 138 Consequently, the Court declined to extend Carroll
139
to allow warrantless searches of everything found in an automobile.
Instead, Justice Powell noted that Chadwick requires that the police assess the exigency of mobility immediately before the search. 140 He
further noted that no such exigency existed at the time of this search because the police had already seized the luggage. 14 1 Justice Powell found
no justification for the extension of Carrollto the warrantless search of
personal luggage merely because the luggage was in a vehicle lawfully
stopped by the police.' 42 Accordingly, the Court held that even when
the police lawfully stop a vehicle and have probable cause to believe
luggage found therein contains contraband, they still must obtain a war143
rant to search the luggage.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that the majority opinion illustrated the "difficulties and confusion" spawned by Chadwick: 144
The Court today goes farther down the Chadwick road, undermines
the automobile exception, and, while purporting to clarify the confusion occasioned by Chadwick, creates, in my view, only greater difficulties for law enforcement officers, for prosecutors, for those suspected of criminal activity, and, of course, for the courts themselves.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
18-22,

Seeid.
See id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1981)).
See id. at 762.
See id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 763.
See id.
See id. at 765.
See id. at 766.
See id. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
24 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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Still hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be litigated, are the briefwallet, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind
case, the 145
container.
Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court should have decided
Chadwick by applying the rationale of Carroll.146 He argued luggage,
like a vehicle, is mobile; thus the expectation of privacy in a suitcase
found in a car is not significantly greater than the expectation of privacy
in a locked glove compartment or a trunk. 147 Although Justice Blackmun agreed that impounding the luggage without searching it would
have been less intrusive than searching it on the scene, 148 he suggested
that any search under these circumstances would not be a further sig149
nificant intrusion because the police had already seized the property.
The dissent also stated that a150search warrant would be routinely forthcoming in a case such as this.
Justice Blackmun emphasized the dilemma facing a police officer
who has properly stopped a vehicle and who now must divide personal
property into three categories for search purposes. Under Chimel v.
California, the officer may search objects within reach of the arrestee. 151 If the officer has probable cause to search the vehicle, then under
Carroll and Chambers the entire interior area of the car may be
searched without a warrant. 152 Under Chadwick and Sanders, however,
any luggage found in the car, outside the reach of the arrestee, cannot be
searched without a warrant absent exigent circumstances. 153 Justice
Blackmun preferred a bright-line rule stating that a warrant should not
be required to seize and search any personal property found in a vehicle
that could be seized and searched without a warrant pursuant to Carroll
154
and Chambers.
Justice Blackmun was not alone with respect to his concern over the

145. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
147. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 769-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority has not distinguished
between the "greater" intrusion of a search and the "lesser" intrusion of a seizure) (citing United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970)).
150. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969)).
152. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925);
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52).
153. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)).
154. See id. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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confusing and impractical nature of search and seizure law. Even the
majority opinion of Justice Powell in Sanders conceded that search and
seizure law is a murky area that is difficult for police officers, lawyers,
and judges to understand. 155 The Sanders majority could have anticipated with foreboding, and the dissent with smug satisfaction,
the ulti156
mate resolution of these issues in Wyoming v. Houghton.

IV.
A.

RECENT CASES

Wyoming v. Houghton

Wyoming v. Houghton demonstrated the Court's willingness to
stretch the bright-line rule delineating the limits of warrantless searches
during traffic stops. In Houghton, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer
stopped a car for speeding and a defective brake light. 157 The driver,
158
David Young, and two female passengers were in the front seat.
While questioning the driver, the officer noticed a hypodermic syringe
in the driver's shirt pocket. After the driver admitted to using the syringe to inject drugs, the officer searched the passenger compartment for
contraband. 159 On the back seat he found a purse, which passenger
Sandra Houghton admitted to owning. 16° In searching the purse, the officer found a brown pouch that contained methamphetamine. 16 1 Ms.
Houghton denied ownership of the pouch. 16 2 Despite her denial, the
163
police arrested her and charged her with possession of narcotics.
The trial court, relying on California v. Acevedo, 164 denied Houghton's motion to suppress, holding that the officer had probable cause to
search the car for contraband and, by extension, any containers contained therein. 165 In reversing, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
the search of Houghton's purse violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id. at 757.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
See id. at 1299.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1299-1300.

164. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
165. See Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (Wyo. 1998) (stating that the trial court relied
on Acevedo in deciding that the officer had probable cause), rev'd, Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S.
Ct. 1297 (1999). Acevedo held that when the police have probable cause to search a container
that is in an automobile, they may search the container and open it without a warrant. See
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
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Amendments because the officer "knew or should have known that the
purse did not belong to the driver, but to one of the passengers," for
whom no probable cause existed. 166 In reversing the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision, Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion
framed the issue as "whether police officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they search a passenger's personal belongings inside an
automobile that they have probable cause to believe contains contra67
band." 1
The majority opinion followed the rationale of United States v.
Ross. 168 In Ross, the Court affirmed that the "automobile exception" to
the search warrant requirement "is unquestionably one that is 'specifically established and well delineated."" 169 The Ross Court declared that
"if probable cause justifi[es] the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
[also] justifie[s] the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search."'' 70 In Houghton, Justice
Scalia noted that cases describing Ross "have characterized it as applying broadly to all containers within a car, without qualification as to

166. Houghton, 119 S.Ct. at 1300 (quoting Houghton, 956 P.2d at 372).
167. Houghton, 119 S.Ct. at 1299. The dissenters from the Wyoming Supreme Court were
most likely pleased with Justice Scalia's framing of the issue because it incorporated language
from prior decisions that had upheld similar searches. See id. In an earlier decision, the Court
had determined whether, in the course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile, the
police are entitled to open containers found within the vehicle. See United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 818 (1982). Essentially, instead of following the more restrictive opinions of United
States v. Chadwick and Arkansas v. Sanders, Justice Scalia framed the issue in Houghton so as to
apply a broader rule derived from Carroll v. United States, Chambers v. Maroney, and Ross. See
Houghton, 119 S.Ct. at 1299 (explaining that an officer who has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband may search it without a warrant and may examine the contents of any
container found within the passenger compartment); see also Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 576-80 (holding that when the police have probable cause to search a container that is in an automobile, they
may search and open the container without a warrant).
168. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1301 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824).
169. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (citation
omitted)). In Ross, the Court held that "the scope of the warrantless search authorized by [the
automobile exception] is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately
authorize by warrant." Id.
170. Id. The Court granted certiorari in Ross to resolve any confusion behind the reasoning in
United States v. Chadwick and Arkansas v. Sanders and the earlier cases first establishing the
automobile exception, such as Carroll v. United States and Chambers v. Maroney. See Acevedo,
500 U.S. at 576-80 (discussing Ross). The Ross Court decided that the object of the search and
places in which there is probable cause to believe the object may be found rather than the nature
of the container in which the contraband is secreted should define the scope of the warrantless
search of the automobile. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 824. The Ross Court reached this decision because, as a practical matter, itwould be unreasonable to allow a police officer to search a vehicle
for contraband upon probable cause but require him to secure a search warrant before opening
containers in the vehicle that could contain narcotics. See id.
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ownership." 171 Following this reasoning, Justice Scalia chose to snip
the threads of United States v. Chadwick and Arkansas v. Sanders,
which had limited the automobile exception. 172 Rather than relying on
the rationales of Chadwick and Sanders, Justice Scalia looked to the
173
original intent of the Framers as discussed in Carroll v. United States.
In so doing, Justice Scalia extended both Carroll and Ross by holding
that if police officers have probable cause to search a lawfully stopped
vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search174of any containers found
inside that may conceal the object of the search.
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed both the privacy
interest of passengers 175 and that the insufficiency of mere propinquity
76
to one suspected of criminal activity as a basis for probable cause,1
Justice Scalia distinguished the cases on which the Wyoming Supreme
Court relied. 177 One such case was United States v. Di Re,' in which
the Court condemned a body search. 179 Justice Scalia noted that the
passengers in Di Re and Houghton had different expectations of privacy
because the search of a purse from a vehicle involved significantly less
171. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1301 (citing Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572). In Acevedo, the Court
upheld a police officer's warrantless search of a paper bag and leather pouch found in the trunk of
the defendant's car because the officers had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained
drugs. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
172. See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) and
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), respectively).
173. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (holding that "contraband goods
concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without
a warrant").
174. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304. Houghton does not directly overrule Sanders. The
Court had already effectively done that in Ross. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 824. The Ross Court distinguished Chadwick and Sanders as not being "automobile exception" cases, characterizing them
instead as container cases. See id. at 814. Although the majorities in both Ross and Houghton
avoid directly overruling either Chadwick or Sanders, the reasoning of Chadwick and Sanders
easily could have been extended in either Ross or Houghton. Instead, the majorities followed and
extended the reasoning from Carroll and Chambers, which established the automobile exception.
See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1297 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 798; Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48;
Carroll,267 U.S. at 132). Houghton does not distinguish between luggage and a purse, but rather
extends the automobile exception established in Carrolland clarified in Ross. See Houghton, 119
S. Ct. at 1304. Houghton, then allows upon probable cause a warrantless search of a passenger's
belongings that may be found in the car, whether they be luggage, purses, or wallets. See id.
175. See Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 367 (Wyo. 1998) (relying upon United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948), which held that probable cause to search a car does not justify a
body search of a passenger), rev'd, Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
176. See Houghton, 956 P.2d at 367 (relying on Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)). The
Court in Ybarra held that authorities did not have probable cause to search all bar patrons simply
because they had a warrant to search the bar and its bartender. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 96.
177. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302.
178. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
179. See id. at 587.
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of an invasion of privacy than a body search. 18° Justice Scalia also
pointed out that the Court's reluctance in Ybarra v. Illinois18 1 to allow
body searches of all the patrons in a bar for which the police held a
search warrant rested upon the significant intrusion into the patrons'
personal bodily privacy. 182 Justice Scalia observed that both cases
turned on the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded
against searches of one's person, which is not expected when police examine an item of personal property found in a car. 183 He further stated
that "[e]ffective law enforcement would be appreciably impaired without the ability to search a passenger's personal belongings when there is
reason to believe contraband or evidence of criminal wrongdoing is
hidden in the car."' 184 Finally, the Court noted that "the 'ready mobility'
of an automobile creates a risk that the evidence or contraband will be
permanently lost while a warrant is obtained."' 185 Accordingly, the ma18 6
jority followed and extended the automobile exception from Carroll,
holding that if probable cause justified the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it also justified the search of every part of the vehicle, including
87
any contents that may conceal the object of the search. 1
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that "the State's legitimate interest in effective law enforcement does not outweigh the privacy concerns
at issue." 188 Justice Stevens further noted that the only other search and
seizure case addressing the distinction between a driver's rights and
those of a passenger was Di Re, where the Court refused to treat those
rights synonymously. 189 Accordingly, Justice Stevens asserted his confidence "in a police officer's ability to apply a rule requiring a warrant
or individualized probable cause to search belongings that are-as in
190
this case-obviously owned by and in the custody of a passenger."'
B.

Knowles v. Iowa

In contrast to Houghton, which revealed the Court's willingness to
180. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302.
181. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
182. See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (citing Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-9 1).
183. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-5 (1968)).
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985)).
186. See id. at 1301 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
187. See id.
188. Id. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Souter joined Justice Stevens's dissent. See id. at 1305 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 1305 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 58387 (1948)).
190. Id. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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extend the bright-line rule governing the automobile exception to the
Warrant Clause, Knowles v. Iowa reinforced the notion that the Court
recognizes limits beyond which they should not venture. In Knowles, a
police officer stopped a motorist in Newton, Iowa after clocking him at
forty-three miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone. 19 1 The
police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation, even though he could
have arrested him under Iowa law. 192 After conducting a full search of
the car, which revealed a bag of marijuana and a "pot pipe," the officer
arrested Knowles and charged him with the appropriate state narcotics
charges.' 93 Knowles subsequently filed a pre-trial motion to suppress,
arguing that the "search could not be sustained under the 'search incident to arrest' exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirehad not placed him under arrest before the ofment because the officer
19 4
car.
his
ficer searched
At the suppression hearing, the police officer conceded that he did
not have probable cause or consent to search the car. 195 Instead, the
State contended that the officer acted pursuant to an Iowa statute, which
provided, "Iowa peace officers having cause to believe that a person has
violated any traffic or motor vehicle equipment law may arrest the person and immediately take the person before a magistrate. '196 The State
also pointed out that Iowa law both authorizes the officer to issue a citation in lieu of arrest 197 and specifically states that such a citation
"'does not affect the officer's authority to conduct an otherwise lawful
search."' 1 98 Finally, the State argued that the Iowa Supreme Court has
held that this particular provision authorizes officers to conduct a complete search of both the automobile and the driver in cases where the
police issue a citation rather than make a custodial arrest.199 Characterizing the search as a search incident to citation, the trial court agreed

191. See Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct. 484, 486 (1998).
192. See id. (noting that Iowa law gives a police officer who has cause to believe that a person
violated any traffic law the authority to arrest the person and take that person before a magistrate).
193. See id.
194. Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). In Robinson, the defendant
was placed under custodial arrest for driving with a revoked license. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at
220. A custodial search revealed that Robinson possessed a cigarette package containing heroin.
See id. at 223. The Court upheld the search as a "search incident to an arrest." See id. at 236.
195. See Knowles, 119 S. Ct. at 486.
196. Id. (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.485(l)(a) (West 1997)).
197. See id. (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 805.1(1) (West 1997)).
198. Id. at 487 (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 805.1(4) (West 1997)).
199. See id. (citing State v. Meyer, 543 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Iowa 1996); State v. Becker, 458
N.W.2d 604, 607 (Iowa 1990)).
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with the State's reasoning and denied Knowles's motion to suppress. 2°°
20 1
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Knowles's conviction.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist first examined the Iowa Supreme Court's decision to uphold the search under its
"search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 20 2 This exception stated that so long as the arresting
officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, a warrantless
search would be reasonable regardless of whether the officer, in fact,
made a custodial arrest. 20 3 The Chief Justice, however, asked whether
the search violated the Fourth Amendment despite the fact that state law
204
authorized it.

Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the two historical rationales
for the "search incident to arrest" exception are: "(1) the need to disarm
the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial., 205 The Chief Justice emphasized
that even though officer safety is important, 20 6 "[t]he threat to officer
safety from issuing a traffic citation ...

case of a custodial arrest.,

20 7

is a good deal less than in the

The Court reasoned that "'[t]he danger to

the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest ...

and its attendant

proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for the arrest.' 20 8 Therefore, the Court concluded that when an officer issues a
citation without an arrest, the underlying rationales that generally sup2 °9
port a search incident to an arrest are absent.
The Court noted that although concerns for officer safety and for the
destruction or loss of evidence justified a search incident to an arrest,
every case did not depend upon the existence of either concern. 2 10 In
the instant case, however, the Court refused to extend that bright-line
rule to a situation where the concern for officer safety was not apparent,
and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence was entirely ab200. See id.
201. See id. (stating that the Iowa Supreme Court relied on State v. Doran, 563 N.W.2d 620
(Iowa 1997)).
202. See id. (discussing the Iowa Supreme Court's characterization of the search as incident to
a citation rather than one incident to an arrest).
203. See id. (citing Doran, 563 N.W.2d at 622).
204. See id.
205. Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)).
206. See id. (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412 (1997) (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam))).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 488 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5).
209. See id.
210. See id.
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sent. 2 1' Accordingly, the Court declined to extend the automobile exception to include warrantless searches incident to citations.
Thus, the Court declined to further extend bright-line rules, that have
already greatly expanded officers' authority to conduct warrantless
searches. 212 This refusal, in itself, is a bright-line rule indicating both
the limits the Court will place upon police power to search during traffic
stops and the point at which the rights of private citizens must be protected. In Knowles, the Court favored a private citizen's expectation of
privacy over the state's interest in effective law enforcement without regard to how much contraband Iowa police officials could recover if they
could, in fact, conduct a full-blown search of every car to which they
issue a traffic citation. Had the Court decided otherwise, every motorist
driving through the State of Iowa who received a traffic citation would
be subject to a full and complete search of his or her car. Here, the
Court drew a line in the sand and created a bright-line rule that police
2 13
officers dare not cross.
C. Significance of Houghton and Knowles
Houghton and Knowles define the Court's willingness to set forth a
bright-line rule regarding the automobile exception, as well as to set a
limit beyond which the Court will not extend the rule. Houghton and
Knowles also clarify the status of Fourth Amendment law, thereby assisting officers and judges in determining the extent to which the police
may conduct warrantless searches. Houghton is heir to the legacy of
214
Carroll v. United States, Chambers v. Maroney, Maryland v. Wilson
and other bright-line cases that permit warrantless searches of automobiles. 2 15 Indeed, Houghton extended United States v. Ross, which set
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984) (setting a "bright-line rule"
by allowing police to detain motorists for routine questioning during a traffic stop); Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (allowing police to conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may
gain immediate control of a weapon); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (authorizing
police to conduct a full search of a passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest).
213. See Knowles, 119 S. Ct. at 488 (holding that warrantless searches of vehicles incident to
citations violate the Fourth Amendment).
214. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). Wilson provided a bright-line rule that an officer who has made a valid traffic stop may order passengers as well as the driver to exit the auto.
See id. at 415. In a spirited dissent, Justice Kennedy lamented that such a ruling may result in
tens of millions of passengers being put at risk of arbitrary control by the police. See id. at 423
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
215. See supra Part 11 (discussing the development of the automobile exception to the Warrant
Clause).
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forth the bright-line rule that once police have lawfully stopped a vehicle for which they have probable cause to search generally for contraband, they may search all containers large enough to contain the items
for which they had probable cause to search.2 16
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Houghton struck a responsive
chord in legal circles, prompting reactions both supporting and opposing the decision. 2 17 For example, Robert T. Scully, Executive Director
of the National Association of Police Organizations, which filed an
amicus brief, praised the Court "for giving officers the tools they need
to do their jobs. Officers must be free of unreasonable, confusing and
unworkable restrictions on what may be searched.- 218 Another editorial
characterized the decision as "a sensible accommodation to law enforcement. ' '2 19 Accordingly, Houghton provided a bright-line rule that
made law enforcement more effective and clarified Fourth Amendment
standards for law enforcement officials.
On the other hand, critics suggest that the decision represents a trend
where "[t]he traditional police power to strictly enforce the traffic laws
is fast becoming a license to freely search for drugs on the roadways." 220 Indeed, noting that the Court recently recognized that when
police officers act with the intent to find illegal drugs, they should have
more freedom to stop cars, detain drivers and passengers, and search
vehicles, 22 1 one commentator stated, "At almost every step, the Court
has cast aside the Fourth Amendment as a check on the police
power." 222 Critics argue that these decisions send the message that
"once you get in your car, you're fair game." 223 Critics also warn that
"[t]his is a continuation of a trend to give law enforcement more power
216. See supra Part IV.A (discussing Houghton's ex:ension of the bright-line rule).
217. See Major Walter M. Hudson, A Few New Developments in the Fourth Amendment, 1999
ARMY LAW. 25, 39 (1999). Indeed, Major Hudson observed that strong reactions, from both political directions, often follow opinions authored by Justice Scalia. See id.
218. David G. Savage, High Court Expands Police Power in Traffic Searches, L.A. TIMES,
April 6, 1999, atAl.
219. Expanded Search a Useful Tool, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, April 9, 1999, at 22.
220. David G. Savage, Privacy Rights Pulled Over: Cops get more power to search personal
effects in vehicles, 85 A.B.A. J. 42, 42 (1999).
221. See id. at 44 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999); Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408 (1997); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996)).
222. Id. (noting that, in recent decisions, the Court has given police officers greater authority
to stop vehicles and search both the drivers and passengers). Similarly, Boston University law
professor Tracey Maclin declared his disappointment concerning the Court's refusal to enforce
the Fourth Amendment on the highways. See id. at 44 (discussing Professor Tracey Maclin's
views).
223. Id. at 44 (quoting Professor Tracey Maclin) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and more discretion over vehicles, drivers and their passengers .... It
means just about anybody can be stopped just about any time. And the
' 224
stop can be used to justify the search.
Although Knowles is less controversial than Houghton, it represents
the only recent setback for law enforcement agencies before the
Court.225 Even after Knowles, however, the Court's extension of the
automobile exception enables police to find that "something more" 226
in
order to justify a "'full-blown search of the automobile and driver."'
In Knowles, the State sought to extend the rationale of bright-line cases
that involved the automobile exception to the Warrant Clause to
authorize warrantless searches incident to citation. 227 Previous brightline rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence have generally favored
state interests at the expense of individual expectations of privacy. For
example, in New York v. Belton, the bright-line rule was that police have
authority to conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers, pursuant to a custodial arrest. 228 Gustafson v.
Florida set forth the bright-line rule that a custodial arrest establishes
the right to search incident thereto. 229 As one writer observed about
Knowles, "Here at least, is one bright-line law in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: a search incident to arrest really means what it says-if
something other than an arrest occurs, one should look beyond this justification to justify the search. 23 °
As to the future of police authority to search pursuant to traffic stops,
Houghton and Knowles arguably establish a watershed. With Houghton, the Court extended the authority of police to conduct searches of
containers during traffic stops nearly as far as possibly imaginable.
Houghton followed Carroll and its progeny in setting forth the authority
of the police to conduct automobile searches based on probable cause.
As Justice Breyer declared in his concurring opinion, though, the brightline rule from Houghton applies only to automobile searches, and then
only to containers found within automobiles; it does not extend to the
search of a passenger. 231 In Knowles, a unanimous Court bluntly stated
that police officers cannot conduct "full-blown" automobile searches
224. Id. at 42 (quoting Professor David A. Harris, University of Toledo law professor).
225. See id. at 44.
226. Id.
227. See Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488 (1998); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
228. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
229. See Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266.
230. Hudson, supra note 217, at 35.
231. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct 1297, 1304 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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incident to a minor traffic citation for which the motorist has not been
232
placed under arrest.
In refusing to extend the bright-line rule of the automobile exception
to the search warrant requirement to allow for searches incident to citations, the Court favored a private citizen's expectation of privacy over
the interests of effective law enforcement. This is an encouraging development. Had the Court acceded to Iowa's request to allow warrantless searches incident to citations, it would have ignored the Constitution in pursuit of potential criminals. This recalls the exchange between
Thomas More and Roper in Robert Bolt's play, A Man For All Sea23 3

sons:

Roper: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to
get to the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?
This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man's
laws, not God's-and if you cut them down-and you're just the man
to do it--d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
would blow then?
Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own
234
safety's sake.

V.

CONCLUSION

The scope of search and seizure law expanded and contracted for
most of the twentieth century, adding to and subtracting from the rights
of individuals and the state. Early cases, such as Carrolland Chambers,
favored state interests in setting "bright-line rules" for searches of
automobiles. Subsequent cases, such as Chadwick and Sanders, favored
individual expectations of privacy over the state's interest in enforcing
the laws. During the 1970s and 1980s, the rules became murky and difficult for police officers to follow and for prosecutors, defense attorneys
and judges to comprehend. Other cases, such as Ross and Houghton,
once again favored the state interests and expressed the law in clear-cut
terms. Because of the clarity of the bright-line rules established in these
cases, police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges can
more clearly comprehend the evolving law of search and seizure. These
cases also demonstrated more than a swinging of the pendulum from

232.
233.
234.

See Knowles, 119 S. Ct. at 488.
See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONs 66 (1962).
Id.

28
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conservative to liberal Courts and back again. They represented an
evolution of the Court's thinking on these issues over time, with its attendant desire to create bright-line rules for ready implementation in
search and seizure jurisprudence. Houghton set forth the extent of police authority to conduct warrantless searches. Knowles, on the other
hand, set forth a bright-line the police cannot cross. Knowles's limitation on further extensions of the bright-line rule bodes well for the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

